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In much sociological research on occupational achievement it is 
presumed that the full effect of education can be understood from 
an examination of years of schooling. It is also commonly assumed 
that the impact of education on career development can be investi- 
gated without reference to an individual's current organizational 
rank. This article shows that, with reference to promotion, several 
features from an employee's educational biography will influence 
his or her rate of advancement. It is also shown that the returns to 
years of schooling-and to other educational measures-vary with 
organizational rank; indeed, employers do not reward educational 
attainment indiscriminately, but only when it is likely to contribute 
to productivity. In conclusion, it is noted that whereas the "job- 
matching" literature argues that the rate of mobility is greatest 
when the fit between an individual's resources and a job's require- 
ments is poor, the results with regard to promotion suggest that the 
converse is true. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While there is a considerable literature that documents the impact of 
education on earnings, occupational status, and the likelihood of promo- 
ti9n (e.g., Mincer 1974; Blau and Duncan 1967; Jencks et al. 1972; Rosen- 
baum 1979; Wise 1975b), the assessments differ concerning which facets 
of educational achievement are, in fact, rewarded in the marketplace. In 
the status-attainment literature it is commonly assumed that a single 
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summary measure-years of schooling-captures the full effect of educa- 
tion (Faia 1981). Economists are more sensitive to the different dimen- 
sions of education and distinguish between general and firm-specific 
training, while also noting that labor force experience frequently can be 
substituted for schooling (Blaug 1976; Sicherman 1991). 
Both economists and sociologists have examined the effects of educa- 
tional credentials, viewed separately from years of schooling. It has been 
argued that certification (whether high school completion or a college 
degree) conveys information to the effect that the minimum standard of 
performance for the credential has been met (Layard and Psacharopoulos 
1974; Faia 1981; Collins 1979). Spence (1973) and Arrow (1973), among 
others, view credentials as a "signal" to a prospective employer about 
the competence of a job applicant, important to the extent that more 
reliable indicators are lacking. Presumably, after employment, with the 
passage of time, the significance of a credential would be superceded by 
direct measures of performance. Nonetheless, there is evidence that some 
firms continue to reward credentials, as a matter of policy, over the full 
course of a worker's career (Spilerman 1986). 
The issue of educational quality has also been a focus of research. This 
theme has been articulated in two ways. It has arisen in explanations of 
the generally smaller income returns to education among certain ethnic 
minorities; the thesis offered is that, because of residential segregation, 
blacks and Hispanics, especially, have limited access to good schools and 
hence receive inferior training (Reynolds 1978, pp. 266-67; Welch 1973, 
pp. 893-907). The issue of quality has also been invoked in explanations 
of the differential returns to education by labor-market sector (Wachter 
1974, pp. 651-58), a topic to which we turn momentarily. A related 
question concerns the impact of prestige of the undergraduate school, an 
indicator of status affiliations, as well as, presumably, of institutional 
quality (Kanter 1977; Collins 1979, pp. 35-43). 
Less attention has been given to investigating the returns to education 
in different work settings. There are hypotheses regarding possible varia- 
tions in the effect of schooling among work positions, such as the formula- 
tions of dual labor market theorists (Osterman 1975; Tolbert, Horan, and 
Beck 1980). It is argued, in this perspective, that income returns are 
higher in primary-sector firms (variously defined) than in secondary ones. 
The proposed explanation is a structural one that emphasizes the linkage 
of jobs into hierarchical ladders in internal labor markets and the con- 
comitant opportunity for occupational advancement and salary growth, 
which is influenced by educational attainment. Andrisani (1973) reported 
results consistent with this thesis, though his analysis has been faulted 
on methodological grounds by Cain (1976). For more recent support of 
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the segmented labor market thesis, see Osberg, Apostle, and Clairmont 
(1987). 
II. EDUCATION AND PROMOTION 
An essential motivation for investigating promotion processes is the inti- 
mate linkage that this topic bears to the study of occupational achieve- 
ment. Promotion is a principal means of growth in occupational status; 
as a consequence, investigations into the determinants of promotion (e.g., 
Wise 1975b; Medoff and Abraham 1980, 1981; Grandjean 1981; Rosen- 
baum 1979; Bielby and Baron 1983) have contributed to our comprehen- 
sion of the dynamics of status attainment over the life course. 
Promotion refers to change of rank within an organization. Rank, or 
grade level, differentiates among workers with respect to status, power, 
and salary; hence, any change in the determinants of promotion, as one 
moves up the organizational ladder, would reveal how an individual's 
ultimate occupational achievement is patterned by particular background 
variables. For example, while race and gender may have little impact on 
advancement prospects in low salary grades, it has been suggested (e.g., 
Kanter 1977, pp. 66-67; Auster 1988, p. 138) that these personal attri- 
butes are significant factors in promotion decisions at higher levels. 
Few studies have examined how the determinants of promotion vary 
with organizational rank. Employees from different salary grades com- 
monly are grouped together in an analysis (e.g., Wise 1975b; Bielby and 
Baron 1983; Medoff and Abraham 1980); in doing so it is implicitly 
assumed that the factors which influence advancement at one organiza- 
tional level play a corresponding role at a different rank. Some exceptions 
are Rosenbaum (1979) and DiPrete and Soule (1988). The former docu- 
mented diverse age x education effects on the promotion rate for three 
occupational groups; the latter, in an analysis of gender and advance- 
ment, reported quite different results by salary grade level. 
In this article we examine the particular role of educational attainment 
in the promotion process. As we have intimated there are reasons for 
believing that the payoff to education is complex and is allocated among 
the different dimensions of educational achievement-years of schooling, 
credentials, school quality, and the like.2 There also are reasons for con- 
2 In an examination of the determinants of salary increases among school teachers, 
Spilerman (1986) reported that some school systems reward number of course credits 
beyond the baccalaureate, other systems reward advanced degrees but not course 
credits, and still others reward mixtures of the two education measures, in various 
combinations. 
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sidering whether the impact of education (more precisely, its several com- 
ponents) differs by rank in an organization. 
There is a basis for suggesting that the returns to education will vary 
with level in a firm. We expect, for example, graduate school training to 
be pertinent to job performance (and advancement, as a reward for supe- 
rior work) in middle and senior grades, the organizational ranks in which 
relevant job skills are likely to have been imparted by specialized aca- 
demic study. Similarly, we expect prestige of the undergraduate in- 
stitution-an indicator of class and fraternal loyalties-to be salient to 
advancement in high salary grades because of the singular importance, 
at this level, of sponsorship and patronage for career success (Kanter 
1977, pp. 61, 181-84). 
The analysis in this paper is organized around a consideration of four 
facets of educational achievement: years of schooling, earned degrees, 
quality of the undergraduate school, and college major. Each facet has 
received some prior consideration with respect to occupational attain- 
ment, though not necessarily in a framework that explores its salience 
in a context of organizational rank. Some reasons for examining these 
educational features were noted in the introduction; to futher motivate 
the investigation we propose several hypotheses, which either represent 
inferences from the status attainment literature or, where that literature is 
lacking, summarize what appears to be common wisdom on the subject. 
Years of Schooling 
This variable measures general education, in contrast with firm-specific 
or job-specific training (Mincer 1974). General education enhances ana- 
lytic and communicative skills and increases intellectual flexibility (Kohn 
1969, pp. 183-88) and, presumably, adaptability in new job assign- 
ments-except where specific technical knowledge is required. Because 
jobs differ by salary grade in required level of education, as an entry 
prerequisite, matching models (e.g., Mobley 1982; S0rensen 1977, 1982) 
predict a corresponding variation between organizational rank and years 
of schooling. 
A more refined formulation would note that the impact of an added 
year of study depends on current educational attainment, as well as on 
salary grade. In low organizational ranks an additional year after high 
school could contribute more to superior job performance (and advance- 
ment prospects) than an equivalent period of study after the bachelor's 
degree. This is because language and computation skills, which are cru- 
cial to success in clerical and secretarial positions, are mastered in second- 
ary school or in the initial years of college. In high organizational ranks, 
in comparison, college and postgraduate study would be the critical levels 
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of education that enhance job performance. This formulation suggests 
that, in each grade, the returns to schooling are nonlinear, with the 
inflection point-the educational level at which additional study has its 
greatest impact-increasing over the salary grades.3 
Credentials 
The empirical evidence concerning the importance of earned degrees, 
above years of schooling, is inconclusive. Faia (1981), analyzing data 
from the 1977 NORC General Social Survey (GSS), found a substantial 
impact of academic degrees on occupational prestige, but a weaker effect 
on earnings. Taubman and Wales (1973) also reached a favorable assess- 
ment about the contribution of earned degrees. Layard and Psacharo- 
poulos (1974), in contrast, found little supporting evidence for credentials 
and concluded that, while "screening is a part of the explanation [of 
earnings differentials], . evidence suggest[s] that [it] is not a major 
part" (p. 995). 
We examine two issues which bear on the role of credentials. First, 
extending the argument in the preceding section, we suggest that, if 
credentials matter, it is the academic degree most relevant to job perfor- 
mance in a particular grade that will have the greatest impact on ad- 
vancement prospects from that rank. Thus, for example, business/secre- 
tarial certification and junior college completion should influence the 
promotion rate in low salary grades, while college and advanced degrees 
should play the same role in higher organizational ranks. 
The second issue concerns the different meanings of credential effects, 
their formulation and measurement. In the framework of the human 
capital model, earned degrees, like years of schooling, are viewed as 
investments that increase cognitive skills, thereby enhancing productivity 
(Arrow 1973, Gintis 1971). In this formulation, a credential certifies com- 
pletion of a program of study with a certain level of attainment. A variant 
of this thesis would have at least some of a credential's association with 
productivity arising from the sorting of individuals in school on the basis 
of ability (Taubman and Wales 1975, pp. 96, 110; Arrow 1973); in short, 
credentials would be seen as tapping heterogeneity among workers rather 
than differences in learned skills. 
In either formulation it is presumed that an employer does not reward 
credentials, per se, but productivity. Both explanations are versions of 
the omitted variable problem: in a promotion regression a significant 
3 To be precise, we assume that the first derivative is positive and increasing with 
years of schooling for values below the inflection point, and positive and decreasing 
for values above the inflection point. 
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credential term arises from the correlation of the credential with an un- 
measured variable-learned cognitive skills in the first instance, innate 
ability in the second. It is the unmeasured variable, however, that is the 
true determinant of productivity (and promotion). It is not possible with 
our data to distinguish between these two formulations, as we lack mea- 
sures of ability and cognitive skills. Both explanations predict significant 
additive effects of earned degrees, net of years of schooling. 
By "credentialism" something different is intended. This concept re- 
fers to a tendency by employers to reward earned degrees, apart from 
any contribution they make to productivity (Faia 1981; Jencks et al. 
1979, pp. 70-83; Harrison 1972, pp. 30-37). Such seemingly irrational 
behavior is explained in terms of the social value of credentials: a prefer- 
ence by firms for workers who have acquired conventional standards of 
sociability, who are culturally compatible, who are presumed capable of 
internalizing organizational goals, and who are therefore deemed "pro- 
motable" (Collins 1979, pp. 19-48; Meyer 1977). The empirical evidence 
in regard to this thesis is, however, contradictory (Blaug 1976, pp. 
845-50). 
A particular formulation of credentialism relates to optimization strate- 
gies available to a firm in a context of uncertainty about worker perfor- 
mance. With respect to promotion and salary decisions concerning new 
hires, Spence (1973) and Arrow (1973) observe that an employer might 
utilize credentials (or other attributes) as "signals" about expected pro- 
ductivity. With the passage of time the importance of a credential would 
decline, as performance records become available and supplant the need 
for a signal. Both Spence and Arrow note that if an employer correctly 
weighs the credential (signal), based on prior experience with its relation 
to performance, the credential term would provide an unbiased estimate 
of productivity differences between the groups; its effect (in a regression 
with productivity unmeasured) would not change as an employer shifts 
from reliance on the signal to an evaluation of a worker's performance 
record. 
There is a basis, however, for suggesting that employers overweigh the 
signals. The credentialism literature speaks of rewards for earned de- 
grees, even when they are only marginally associated with productivity. 
Such behavior is difficult to understand when a performance record is 
available for a worker, but in the absence of productivity information a 
manager may have good reason to be conservative. Hiring and advance- 
ment decisions involve training costs, and the dismissal of an unsatisfac- 
tory employee can be difficult and expensive. A cautious manager might 
choose to protect himself, in this circumstance, by advancing workers 
for whom credentials are available, so that he would be able to justify 
his decision in the case of a poor selection (Merton 1957, pp. 149-87; 
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Thurow 1975, pp. 170-77).4 Under this thesis, credentials, initially, 
would be overrewarded, but the effect would decline with tenure, as 
performance data became available and replaced earned degrees as a 
basis for personnel decisions. 
This latter formulation of credentialism-a variant of the "signal 
thesis"-can be distinguished from the skill-acquisition (or ability- 
sorting) explanation of credential effects in the following manner: under 
credentialism, net of years of study, we should find a positive effect for 
an earned degree and a negative effect for the interaction of the degree 
with seniority, indicating atrophy of the credential with time. Under the 
skill-acquisition explanation we should find an earned degree effect, but 
no significant interaction with seniority. 
College Quality 
Weisbrod and Karpoff (1968) and Wales (1973) reported a positive associ- 
ation between college quality and earnings; Wise (1973a; 1973b) found 
that college quality (measured by selectivity) is a strong predictor of both 
salary increase and promotion. In none of these studies was the effect 
examined by organizational rank. In line with our comments regarding 
years of schooling, we expect institutional quality to have its greatest 
impact in the salary grades in which college study contributes to job 
performance-presumably, the middle and senior ranks. 
College quality has been interpreted as an indicator of the richness of 
the educational experience-"persons from better schools learn more 
than those in poorer schools, so their accrued academic knowledge is 
greater" (Wise 1973a, p. 363). On the other hand, quality schools proba- 
bly attract more-able pupils (Addison and Siebert 1979, p. 135). In the 
absence of ability measures either contention-additional learning or 
heterogeneity-would produce a positive effect of college quality on pro- 
motion, an effect that would not erode with seniority. 
College quality, however, could also be used by an employer, along 
with credentials, to screen new hires in a situation where few measures 
of productivity are available. If college quality were utilized in this way, 
as a "signal," then, following the formulation in the preceding section, 
a positive effect should be noted for new hires, but one that atrophies 
with seniority as direct measures of performance become available (i.e., 
negative interaction between school quality and seniority). 
4 Lester Thurow suggests that even if employers correctly assess the productivity 
differential associated with a signal, because of the zero-one nature of hiring and 
promotion decisions the preferred group will be overselected (1975, pp. 172-75). See 
Bielby and Baron (1986, p. 792) regarding other reasons for employers' misperception 
and misevaluation of workers' ability. 
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College Major 
In an analysis of the determinants of salary growth in "a large manufac- 
turing corporation," Wise (1973a) reported information for three catego- 
ries of college major. Controlling for other features of an individual's 
education record, he found a substantial positive impact for a science/ 
engineering major, a smaller effect for a liberal arts major, and the lowest 
efficacy for a business major. 
Certainly the industrial specialty of a company is one determinant of 
the relevance of different college majors for advancement. However, we 
expect, in addition, a more or less universal association, across firms, 
between grade level and the returns to college major. In particular, in 
the middle ranks of a corporate bureaucracy, where the details of com- 
pany policy are elaborated and their consequences extrapolated, employ- 
ees who have concentrated in analytic fields-mathematics and the 
sciences-should be superior workers. In the highest corporate ranks 
the dominant activities are policy formulation, negotiation with external 
actors, and alliance building. A background in humanities or the social 
sciences would appear beneficial for these tasks.5 
College major may also predict promotion because it is correlated with 
ability, broadly conceived, and we lack a measure of this construct. 
Thus, national Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores are highest for 
science and math majors, lower for social science majors, and still lower 
for students in education and business (College Board 1988, p. 8). How- 
ever, if college major merely serves as a proxy for unmeasured ability, 
the major effects should not vary over the salary grades, as general 
ability-distinguished from specialized skills-should be universally val- 
ued. Finally, if college major is used by the firm to screen for prospective 
performance, then, following the signal argument outlined earlier, we 
should observe a decline with seniority in the effects of the major terms 
(i.e., negative interactions with seniority). 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
The data for this study were taken from the personnel records of a large 
insurance company with headquarters in the northeast. During the 1970s 
the company employed approximately 16,000 individuals at any given 
time. The information made available to us covers job histories within 
the company of all workers who either were employed as of year-end 
1970 or entered employment between 1971 and 1978. 
5 Collins (1979, p. 32) makes a similar observation: "Specialized or technical skills 
are considered to be of minor importance, at least above the level of lower supervisory 
jobs. " 
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The company is hierarchically organized into salary grade levels 
(SGLs), from grade 1 (lowest) to grade 20 (highest). Above grade 20 
are the vice presidential ranks, which are not part of the study (though 
promotion from grade 20 is included). The hierarchy is explicit in written 
documents, is clearly perceived by the employees, and provides the basis 
for the firm's definition of promotion-a grade increase. Aside from a 
small number of maintenance and craft workers (not included), the em- 
ployees are white collar and are not unionized. 
We analyze the rate of promotion for each of six groupings of salary 
grade levels (SGLs 1-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-10, 11-14, 15-20). The clustering 
of multiple grades in the two highest categories results from the small 
number of employees in those ranks, given the pyramidal shape of the 
company. The regressions discussed below are based on a 30% random 
sample of workers in the two lowest SGL categories; on 50% and 70% 
samples, respectively, in the next two categories, and on all employees 
in the two highest grade level groupings. 
Promotions are investigated by means of a continuous-time transition 
rate model (Tuma and Hannan 1984). In particular, let the rate of ad- 
vancement from grade i, after duration t in the grade, be 
hi,j+ l(t I z) = lim Pi[t ' T < t + At I T-t; z]/At, (1) 
At ; o 
where T is a random variable denoting months in grade i, z is a vector 
of covariates, and P[ ] denotes a probability. Departures from the organi- 
zation, demotions, and incomplete intervals were treated as censored 
observations. 
Regarding the shape of the hazard (1), a Gompertz specification was 
used,6 
hi,j+l(tIz,x) = exp (at + b'z + c'x), (2) 
in which z is a vector of control variables, and x is a vector of covariates 
of interest-the education measures. The vector of controls contained 
the following terms: race (a set of four dummies), sex, age, seniority, and 
one or more grade-level dummies to correct for additive differences (in 
the exponent) in the effects of individual grades within an SGL category. 
To conserve space, only the coefficients of interest, for the education 
variables, are reported in the tables of regression equations. 
The employee data base contains the following education information: 
(a) a set of 10 categorical variables that convey level of academic attain- 
6 As a test of the sensitivity to this assumption, several regressions were also run with 
a log logistic specification; they show little difference in covariate effects from the 
values reported in the tables. 
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ment,' (b) the name of the school from which the bachelor's degree was 
earned, and (c) the college major. Several measures were constructed 
from these data. 
Years of Schooling 
In a few analyses, dummy variables, constructed from the categorical 
terms, were introduced directly into a regression; more often, a continu- 
ous formulation of years of schooling (EDUC) was used, which was cre- 
ated from the categorical terms. The assignment followed in defining 
EDUC is a fairly standard one: "high school graduate" was given the 
value "12," "junior college degree" was coded "14," "bachelor's de- 
gree" was assigned "16," and so on. In a few cases somewhat arbitrary 
assumptions were made: for example, "less than four years of high 
school" was assigned the value "10," "college courses, but less than 60 
credits" was assigned "13." 
Credentials 
The 10 categorical variables are explicit with respect to highest earned 
degree and were the source of three credential dummies: business/secre- 
tarial graduate (B/S), junior college graduate (JC), and master's degree 
(MA). In the analysis of credential effects our strategy was to introduce 
the three dummies together with variables for years of schooling (EDUC) 
and the square of this term. The dummies, then, convey the impact of 
credentials, net of the effect of length of study. 
There is no dummy for bachelor's degree. Since the source of both 
the credential terms and EDUC are the 10 categorical variables, each 
credential is necessarily associated with a particular length of schooling. 
The consequence of including a credential dummy in the preceding for- 
mulation is to remove its years-of-schooling value from the estimation of 
the EDUC and (EDUC)2 coefficients. This is not a difficulty as long as 
a substantial number of observations remain, especially at the extremes 
of EDUC, to accurately estimate the two slopes. In the present study the 
many instances of "high school graduate" serve to anchor the low end 
of EDUC, in the context of dummies for B/S and JC. At the upper 
end, however, the inclusion of dummies for both bachelor's and master's 
degrees would have presented a problem. 
7 The categorical variables are: EO = less than four years of high school; E 1 = high 
school graduate; E 2 = high school plus secretarial/business school; E3 = less than 
60 college credits; E4 = more than 60 college credits; E5 = junior college degree; 
E6 = BA degree; E7 = some graduate study; E8 = master's degree; E9 = doctorate. 
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Institutional Quality 
Selectivity was coded from Barron's (1980) Profile of American Colleges. 
In this volume, undergraduate-degree-granting schools are assigned to 
one of six categories on the basis of the difficulty of securing admission. 
A single variable was constructed from these ordered categories, with 
values ranging from one ("non-competitive") to six ("most competi- 
tive"). The few schools not listed in Barron's were assigned the value 
zero on the grounds that they are too minor to be included in the volume, 
even in the noncompetitive category. 
Employees were assigned the selectivity score appropriate to their insti- 
tution; workers who did not attend college were assigned the value zero. 
The selectivity measure was entered in a regression model together with 
a second variable, a dummy term (NO COLLEGE), coded "0" if the 
employee went to college and "1" otherwise. The resulting expression 
in the exponent of equation (2), 
bl(NO COLLEGE) + b2(SELECTIVITY), (3) 
produces the following effect coding: b2 (SELECTIVITY) if the employee 
attended college and b1 otherwise. 
College Major 
Four dummy variables were created to summarize a variety of fields of 
study: social science/humanities, business/insurance, math/science/engi- 
neering, and a residual category, NO COLLEGE. The last term also 
includes a very few employees who attended college but for whom a 
major was not reported. 
Means for the controls and the education variables are reported in 
table 1. There are few surprises in this material, and we note only the 
principal patterns. Turning to the controls, duration in a grade rises 
with rank, but the differences are not large. With respect to race, the 
representation of blacks and Hispanics declines sharply over the grades; 
their percentages in the highest SGL category are less than one-tenth 
their rates in the lowest grades. The gender effect is similar: percentage 
female declines from 91% in the lowest SGL category to 8.5% in the 
highest corporate ranks. 
The education variables also reveal expected patterns. Years of school- 
ing (EDUC) increases over the grades, as does the proportion of employ- 
ees holding a master's degree. In contrast, there is a decline in the propor- 
tions with B/S and JC as their highest credential. The college selectivity 
variable reported in the table is adjusted to reflect only employees who 
attended college. This measure fails to reveal any trend over the grades 
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in college quality; the one anomaly, the high score in the lowest SGL 
category, should be discounted as it is based on a small number of cases. 
The distribution of college majors, by salary grade, is more interesting 
and shows an increase in business/insurance and math/science/engi- 
neering specialties, relative to social science/humanities, as one moves 
up the corporate ranks. 
IV. FULL SAMPLE RESULTS 
In table 2 we report findings from the analysis of a representative 20% 
sample of employees from all grade levels. The education terms in each 
column were estimated via a model of the form (2), in which controls 
were present for gender, race, age, seniority, and SGL level. 
What we observe in table 2 are the following: (a) a strong tendency for 
promotion to be associated with years of schooling (col. 1), the effect 
being linear in the exponent (note the insignificance of EDUC2 in col. 2); 
(b) a credential effect, but only for business/secretarial graduate, with a 
negative influence on promotion (cols. 3, 4); and (c) rather clear evidence 
of promotion being associated with college selectivity and with a math/ 
science/engineering major (cols. 5, 6). The final three columns fail to 
reveal any significant interactions with seniority. 
The returns to years of schooling, college selectivity, and math/science/ 
engineering major are consistent with results reported by others (e.g., 
Wales 1973; Wise 1975b; Pfeffer 1981, pp. 347-52). The credential effects 
are more surprising, in regard to both the negative sign of the significant 
B/S dummy and the failure to find a contribution from an advanced 
degree. Also noteworthy is the lack of evidence for a "signal" thesis, at 
least in its present formulation. 
Before commenting on the credential effects it should be noted that 
they are not a result of constraining the years-of-schooling variable to be 
linear. Equations (3) and (4) reveal virtually identical results, whether 
the credential coefficients are measured as deviations from a linear or a 
quadratic function of EDUC. Nor is the negative B/S finding a conse- 
quence of an incorrect assignment of years-of-schooling to this degree. 
Equation (3) was reestimated, with the business/secretarial degree varied 
between 12 and 13 years, without the negative effect being altered appre- 
ciably. 
This negative credential is consistent with two explanations: (1) self- 
selection by high school graduates with limited ability or modest ambition 
into a secretarial/business training program, in which case, in the absence 
of ability or ambition measures, the B/S term would serve as a proxy for 
these variables; or (2) a learning process, in which the credential measures 
skill acquisition associated with completion of the training program. 
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Normally, with our data, we cannot distinguish between the two expla- 
nations. In the present case, however, we discount the learning thesis 
because it is difficult to associate a negative effect with "learning" and 
because, as noted, the coefficient remains negative even when the B/S 
credential is equated (in years of study) with the high school graduate 
level; that is, no credit given for time spent in post-high school training. 
The preceding discussion was intended to provide summary informa- 
tion about the impact of the different educational features on occupa- 
tional advancement, as well as to assess whether our results replicate the 
reports of researchers who have investigated other firms. Our findings 
appear to be typical of large corporate bureaucracies, enhancing our 
confidence in the generalizability of the results. We now turn to an analy- 
sis of the variation in educational effects over the salary grades. 
V. RETURNS TO EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, BY 
ORGANIZATIONAL RANK 
Years of Schooling 
What is the impact of length of study on advancement prospects? In part 
A of table 3 we report, by SGL category, regressions of the promotion 
hazard on EDUC; each model is of the form (2) and contains controls for 
gender, race, age, seniority, and detailed SGL. Here EDUC appears as 
a linear variable in the exponent of these equations. Quadratic functions 
of EDUC were also estimated; however, in no case was the quadratic 
term significant. 
The returns to years of schooling, viewed across the SGL categories, 
describe a unimodal curve (top row). The returns are small in the lowest 
and highest grades, and peak in the middle ranks. One explanation for 
this curvilinear pattern was provided by personnel managers in the insur- 
ance company: in the lowest grades, they contend, promotions are largely 
scheduled and require little more than acceptable attendance and the 
meeting of minimum performance standards. Thus, differences in school- 
ing among employees do not get expressed in the promotion rate. In 
the highest ranks, in comparison, it is leadership style, personality, and 
political alliances-rather than educational attainment-that determine 
advancement.8 Only in the middle ranks, where bureaucratic competence 
8 In some instances loyalty is rewarded directly by appreciative superiors. More com- 
monly, social linkages and appropriate personal characteristics facilitate job perfor- 
mance. (As a result, a manager could make promotion decisions on the basis of 
universalistic criteria-i.e., productivity-even though particularistic considerations 
underlie the performance differences.) In either case, the impact of schooling is 
lessened. 
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and analytic skills are critical for carrying out the more or less routine 
supervisory and technical tasks, does length of study have a substantial 
impact on promotion. It is in these grades that employees are sorted, with 
respect to future advancement, on the basis of human capital measures. 
The preceding account represents management's view of the reward 
structure. A somewhat different insight is obtained from an examination 
of part B, in which educational attainment is represented by a series of 
dummy terms. Ignoring, for the moment, the depressed value of E2 in 
SGLs 1-3 and 4-5,9 in four of the six SGL categories the shape of the 
promotion response to years of schooling is consistent with a step-function 
formulation. Further, the inflection point-the locus of maximum gain 
from additional schooling-increases over the ranks: in the lowest SGL 
category the distinction of importance is the shift from "less than high 
school" (EO) to "high school graduate" (E 1); in the next grade category 
it is the shift from "some college" (E3) to "junior college/more than 60 
credits" (E45) that is rewarded,'0 and in the two highest SGL categories 
only graduate training (E 79) contributes to the promotion rate. 
These results provide support for the contention that, at each organiza- 
tional level, certain educational skills are critical to job performance, and 
it is principally the acquisition of these skills that is rewarded. Additional 
schooling that does not bring one up to the critical level for a grade does 
not appear to be translated into a corresponding increase in the promotion 
rate-the results for SGLs 11-14 and 15-20 are informative on this 
point. Correspondingly, additional study above the level at which the 
skills crucial for task performance are imparted also receives little recog- 
nition in the promotion rate-see SGLs 1-3 and 4-5. 
The results for the middle SGL categories (6-7 and 8-10) reveal a 
different pattern. In the former the education effects are linear; in the 
latter the results are ambiguous. These promotion responses may reflect 
a situation in which years of schooling enhances job performance over 
the full range of the education variable. Alternatively, the observed re- 
sults could derive from the fact that the occupational tasks are very 
heterogeneous; these grades contain the highest rungs of the clerical job 
ladders as well as the entry steps of the professional/administrative lines. 
As a consequence, the response patterns may represent mixtures of more 
basic step-functions for the component jobs." 
9 The term E 2 denotes "high school graduate plus secretarial/business school." In 
the next section we argue that this kind of postsecondary training is associated with 
a negative credential effect, one that is superimposed on the returns to years of school- 
ing. This result is also apparent from models (3) and (4) of table 2. 
'0 We attribute the fluctuations in the terms following E45, in SGL 4-5, to the rela- 
tively small numbers of college graduates and postgraduates in low salary grades. 
" Some evidence for a mixture interpretation was obtained by allocating employees 
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In regard to promotion, then, the evidence is fairly clear that the re- 
turns to schooling vary with organizational rank. Use of a single linear 
variable suggests that the impact of an additional year is greatest in the 
middle salary grades. However, when schooling is represented by a series 
of dummy terms, a more refined explanation is suggested, one in which 
a particular length of study is seen as critical to job performance (and 
advancement) in each salary grade. Thus, in low ranks, where clerical 
and secretarial tasks predominate, the crucial skills involve a facility 
with basic arithmetic and acquaintance with English language rules-for 
which high school completion and, perhaps, some college would suffice. 
In the highest grades of the company, in comparison, the critical skills 
involve mastery of subjects such as marketing, investment, and actuarial 
science, and it is therefore advanced academic training that is rewarded. 
Credential Effects 
Six credentials are recorded in the employee data base: high school gradu- 
ate, business/secretarial school graduate, junior college degree, bache- 
lor's degree, master's degree, and doctorate. The effect of a doctoral 
degree was not investigated, as the number of employees with this degree 
is very small. Also, for reasons noted earlier, dummy terms were not 
defined for high school graduates or recipients of the bachelor's degree. 
This analysis, therefore, is restricted to the contributions of three levels 
of certification: business/secretarial graduate, junior college degree, and 
master's degree. 
By "credential effects" we refer to the impact of earned degrees on 
the promotion rate, net of the returns to years of schooling. In part A of 
table 4 we report, for each of the six SGL groupings, the results from a 
hazard formulation (eq. 2), with variables present for EDUC, (EDUC)2, 
the credential terms, and the aforenoted controls. Even though (EDUC)2 
is highly correlated with EDUC, the quadratic term is introduced so that 
the credential dummies are measured as deviations from a years-of- 
schooling function which is not constrained to be linear (in the expo- 
nent). 12 
in the middle SGL categories between clerical and administrative lines of work. In 
SGL 6-7, for example, the clerical lines have the dummy effects .053, .124, .402*, 
.540* for E23-E 79, respectively (*P < .01); in short, there is little impact of education 
before level E6. 
12 Without (EDUC)2 present, the variable EDUC is significant and has values that 
approximate those given in pt. A of table 3. The credential terms from a linear 
formulation of EDUC show effects that are similar to, but somewhat stronger than, 
the ones reported in table 4. The quadratic expression in the text is the more conserva- 
tive formulation for estimating the magnitude of the credential terms. 
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We observe, in table 4, part A, consistent negative returns across the 
salary grades to business/secretarial study; the effects are significant in 
the two lowest grade categories and in SGL 11-14. Completion of a 
master's degree is rare in the lowest salary grades (less than 1 % of obser- 
vations); a dummy term for this credential was therefore omitted. In 
the middle SGL categories the returns to master's degree are small and 
insignificant; in the two highest salary grade categories, however, the 
coefficient for a master's is positive and significant. The junior college 
term is fairly small in magnitude and insignificant in all grades. 
With one exception the business/secretarial term is significant only in 
the lowest SGL categories, and the MA term only in the highest salary 
grades. One is tempted to interpret these results as supporting a thesis 
of reward allocation by firms for the academic degree most relevant to 
job performance in the particular rank; in short, a formulation that paral- 
lels the conclusions reached with the years-of-schooling dummies. Yet 
the results for the two credentials are really quite different. The MA 
effects support this contention-the dummy variables are small except 
in the grades in which the skills associated with advanced academic 
training would be useful. The B/S term, however, is negative and sub- 
stantial in all salary grades; its insignificance in the higher SGLs is proba- 
bly due to the rarity of this credential in senior ranks rather than to a 
lessening of effect on the promotion rate. 
Now, there is no reason to expect the different credentials we investi- 
gate to all have the same consequence for advancement, and there is no 
necessity, therefore, for performing a universal test of a "credential ef- 
fect." An employer might use some degrees as "signals," while dis- 
counting others; some credentials may provide skills specific to task per- 
formance in certain jobs and in the associated grades, while others are 
diffuse in their impact (Spence 1973, p. 359). In line with this reasoning, 
in the analysis of interaction effects (table 4, pt. B), our strategy is to 
examine separately the pattern for each degree. 13 
With respect to a master's degree, the interaction with seniority is 
never significant. This suggests that its impact on the promotion rate 
does not atrophy with length of service; there is no evidence for "creden- 
tialism," in the sense of a signal invested with elevated significance in 
the absence of performance measures. Rather, a master's degree increases 
one's promotion prospects independent of employment duration. The fur- 
ther result (from pt. A) that the MA effect operates only in the highest 
13 The junior college effects were small in all our test runs and the interactions with 
seniority were never significant. As a result, the interaction terms were omitted in the 
final regressions. 
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salary grades reinforces our earlier assessment, from table 3, that it is 
academic training relevant to job performance which is being rewarded. 
In comparison, the interactions of the B/S terms with seniority are 
contradictory. In SGLs 1-3 and 6-7 the positive interactions support a 
"credentialism" interpretation: In the absence of performance measures, 
employers act as if it is individuals with modest ability, or low career 
aspirations, who undertake this training; in short, the credential is disval- 
ued. With the passage of time, the impact of the credential is mitigated 
(positive interaction with seniority) as performance data become avail- 
able. In other SGLs, however, the interaction term is insignificant, sug- 
gesting that while this degree may be correlated with (omitted) determi- 
nants of performance, the degree itself is not treated by employers as a 
signal. 
Rather than propose different explanations by salary grade level, we 
restrict our assessment concerning the B/S degree to the consistent results 
with the additive terms (table 4, pt. A). From this material, it is evident 
that a B/S credential has a negative effect, one that is universal across 
salary grades. Whether the depressed promotion rate is a result of self- 
selection into secretarial training by workers of modest ability (no interac- 
tion) or whether employers initially stigmatize workers having this educa- 
tional background (positive interaction) remains unclear. 
To summarize, academic degrees do have an effect, net of years of 
schooling, but the evidence for "credentialism"-as the thesis is formu- 
lated in this paper-is modest. Rather, we find that a master's degree 
increases the rate of promotion in the higher salary grades, where the 
skills associated with this degree can enhance work performance. A busi- 
ness/secretarial certificate influences the advancement rate for a different 
reason; either in fact or in the stereotypical views of employers, it is 
associated with weak job performance or low career aspirations.'4 
College Quality 
Wise (1 975b) reported a positive effect of college selectivity on the promo- 
tion rate. Our results, using the full sample (col. 5 of table 2), corroborate 
14 To be certain that our results are not an artifact of the coding scheme, we performed 
the following sensitivity analyses: We varied the EDUC value for B/S from 12 to 13 
years, which corresponds to an average length of secretarial study of zero to one year. 
We also varied the length of study assigned to the master's degree from one to two 
years. The results from these assignments differed only modestly from the values 
presented in the text and did not alter the thrust of our assessment. 
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his findings. We also noted the absence of an interaction with seniority 
(col. 8), which suggests that college quality is not used by employers as 
a "signal" regarding expected productivity. 
The motivation for examining the impact of college quality by organi- 
zational rank derives from the conclusions to the preceding sections. In 
particular, we have observed that both years of schooling (EDUC) and 
a master's degree have effects that vary by salary grade, and that the 
pattern of these effects conforms to a formulation in which employers 
reward educational attainment that is consistent with work requirements 
in a particular rank. Now, college quality does not tap level of academic 
attainment. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to postulate that in the jobs 
(and grades) in which college training contributes valued skills, gradua- 
tion from an institution of superior standing would signify an enriched 
education. For this reason, we expect college selectivity-our indicator 
of quality-to predict promotion, especially in the middle and senior 
organizational ranks. 
In table 5 we report hazard regressions, with the variables of interest 
coded in accordance with the formulation of equation (3). The results in 
part A provide only modest support for our contention. Selectivity, in- 
deed, is positive and significant in grades 8-10 and 11-14. However, the 
magnitude of the selectivity coefficient is equally large in lower SGLs, 
raising the possibility of insignificance in those ranks only because of the 
paucity of employees with college training. Further, there is no evidence 
of a selectivity effect in the highest SGL category. 
Part B is revealing about this ambiguity. Here the selectivity effects 
are significant and substantial in grades 6-7 through 11-14. Further, the 
interactions with seniority are also significant-and negative-in the 
three SGL categories. These findings suggest that college selectivity is 
used as a "quality signal" by employers in regard to the expected perfor- 
mance of recent hires (Pfeffer 1981, p. 352), much as has been argued 
with respect to earned credentials. The quality signal is utilized in initial 
promotion decisions, in the middle organizational ranks, where college 
training would provide relevant job skills. The interaction effect in the 
highest SGLs, though not significant, is consistent with this argument; 
the insignificance probably reflects the small number of individuals hired 
directly into the senior ranks. 
In summary, in regard to college quality, we find considerable evidence 
in support of a "signal" thesis, with a further indication that the signal is 
activated, principally, in the middle grades. The absence of a significant 
interaction in the representative sample of company employees (col. 8 of 
table 2) is misleading with respect to the true role of college quality in 
promotion decisions and can be attributed to the large proportion of the 
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work force engaged in low salary grades, where advanced study has little 
impact on job performance. 
College Major 
Wise (1975b) reported a significant effect of a math/engineering major on 
the probability of promotion; our results with the representative sample 
of employees confirm his findings (col. 6 of table 2). Also, since the inter- 
actions with seniority (col. 9) are insignificant, a thesis to the effect that 
college major is used by employers as a "productivity signal" fails to 
find support, at least in its current formulation. 
At the outset of the paper we suggested that college major might serve 
as a proxy for ability (unmeasured in our data base). This possibility is 
credible because a math/science concentration is, indeed, associated with 
high SAT scores (College Board 1988, p. 8). If this omitted variable thesis 
is correct, then a math/science major should have a positive effect on the 
rate of promotion in all SGLs, since general ability, presumably, would 
enhance work performance in every rank. An alternate possibility is that 
the math/science/engineering major contributes to productivity only in 
jobs that require advanced analytic skills-presumably positions in the 
middle organizational ranks (Pfeffer 1981, pp. 346-50). A third thesis is 
that some majors are used by an employer as "signals," relied upon as 
peformance indicators for newly hired workers. Akin to the credentialism 
formulation, a significant interaction with seniority would constitute sup- 
port for this contention. 
The impact of field of study on the rate of promotion is addressed in 
table 6, in which survival regressions are reported. The reference cate- 
gory for the college major effects is social science/humanities; relative to 
this specialty there is a clear indication that a math/science/engineering 
concentration is advantageous, with respect to the promotion rate, in all 
salary grades except SGL 11-14 (pt. A).15 The reason for the lack of 
effect in the latter grade category could not be ascertained. 
The introduction of interaction terms between college major and se- 
niority does not alter the findings with respect to a math/science/engi- 
neering concentration: in no case is the interaction term significant (table 
6, pt. B). However, a significant interaction (negative) between business 
major and seniority does appear in the middle grades-SGLs 6-7 and 
8-10. In conjunction with the positive main effects, this result suggests 
15 The effect of the NO COLLEGE term (positive and significant in SGL 15-20) has 
no evident substantive interpretation. The EDUC variable in these regressions con- 
trols for years of schooling; the dummy for no college is included to obtain a proper 
specification of the college major terms. 
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that the business major is invested with special significance by employers, 
relied upon as a "signal" of competence or commitment, in the absence 
of performance information. 
With respect to college major we conclude that a math/science/engi- 
neering concentration does increase the rate of promotion, either because 
more-able students self-select into this specialty or because the associated 
skills are useful in insurance company jobs. Because a match/science! 
engineering major is rare in the two lowest grade categories, it is not 
possible to choose definitively between these explanations, such as by 
examining whether this specialty enhances the promotion rate in low 
ranks, where advanced mathematics would have little relevance for job 
performance. (Nonetheless, the broad range of grades in which a math! 
science/engineering concentration is significant speaks for ability sorting 
as the more likely explanation.) There is no indication that this major is 
accorded particular significance by employers (no interaction effect); a 
contrary conclusion, however, should be drawn with respect to a college 
major in business studies. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY ABOUT 
ATTAINMENT PROCESSES 
The objective of this paper was to investigate the promotion returns to 
different educational features, giving special consideration to how the 
returns vary with position in an organization. With respect to an individ- 
ual's educational biography, it is evident that each of the factors-years 
of schooling, earned degrees, college quality, and college major-bears 
some influence on advancement prospects. 
The way in which these educational components contribute to the 
promotion rate is clarified once considerations of organizational rank 
are introduced. Indeed, the principal finding from this analysis is that 
employers reward schooling to the extent it is relevant to job perfor- 
mance; as a result, the particular educational features that predict to 
advancement vary with salary grade and, presumably, with other job 
characteristics as well. 
Whether one views employers as rewarding educational attainment 
directly, or indirectly via its effect on job performance, it is not the case 
that scholastic attainment is compensated indiscriminately; with respect 
to promotion prospects, "more is not necessarily better." Rather, the 
greatest impact of education occurs at the point at which supplementary 
schooling is likely to convey job relevant skills. Additional study that is 
below the threshold for effectiveness in a work setting produces little 
impact on the promotion rate; schooling in excess of the educational 
requirements for a job appears to be treated by employers as superfluous. 
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Support for this assertion is evident with respect to years of study (pt. B 
of table 3), though much the same conclusion can be drawn from an 
evaluation of the master's credential and college quality. 
The Matching of Workers and Jobs 
It would seem that these findings are at variance with the job matching 
literature. In that literature a dynamic formulation of career evolution is 
proposed in which the rate of job changing corresponds to the discrep- 
ancy between an individual's resources and a job's requirements-the 
rate is highest when the fit is poor and it slows down with age (or senior- 
ity), as experience with prior job tasks permits workers and employers to 
arrive at a suitable "match" (Jovanovic 1979; Mobley 1982, pp. 96-118; 
S0rensen 1977, 1982). 16 What we find, instead, is that the rate of promo- 
tion (job changing) is maximum when the fit between education and job 
requirements is best and lower when educational attainment is insuffi- 
cient for effective task performance. 
This apparent contradiction between the matching literature and our 
findings is resolved once we consider which actor-worker or em- 
ployer-controls the job-change decision. Termination of employment, 
especially from large companies, is primarily at the initiative of the 
worker,17 though firms are not without strategies for encouraging the 
departure of unwanted employees. In general, if a worker is displeased 
with the match, if he feels that his resources make him worthy of a 
better job, he will look elsewhere. With the passage of time the worker, 
presumably, succeeds in arriving at a suitable match-either because a 
more satisfying position has been found or because his appraisal of his 
own resources has been lowered-and the rate of job changing declines. 
Promotion, however, represents a different kind of job change. This 
decision is made by the employer, not by a worker. It is based on a 
worker's productivity record; as such it is a reward for superior perfor- 
mance. What we find is that the rate of promotion peaks when there 
is a good match between a worker's educational background and the 
requirements of his current job, and it is lower when the match is poor. 
S0rensen (1977, p. 972) and Jovanovic (1979, p. 976), incidentally, make 
clear that their job matching formulations refer to the calculations of 
workers; from the perspective of an employer the intent is to motivate 
16 S0rensen (1977, p. 972) uses a slightly different formulation of career evolution; he 
bases the rate of mobility on the discrepancy between an individual's current attain- 
ment and potential attainment, given his or her resources. 
17 Aside from cyclical layoffs, dismissals are not common because of contractual and 
legally mandated due process procedures. At the insurance company, for example, 
14% of terminations during 1971-78 were classified as "involuntary." 
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and reward productivity, which is heightened, presumably, when the 
correspondence is optimal. 
With regard to career dynamics, our results suggest the following stra- 
tegic considerations for a worker: It is important to enter an organization 
at a rank in which one's educational attainment is not much above the 
norm for the grade, because superior education provides little return 
in promotion prospects. With advancement, at the point where one's 
educational qualifications fit the prerequisites for the job, one is advan- 
taged with respect to less educated workers but not handicapped in refer- 
ence to better-trained employees. With further promotion the worker 
begins to find himself at a disadvantage with respect to better-schooled 
employees, as the scope of job requirements is extended. 
These results are reminiscent of the "Peter Principle"-the cliche 
which predicts that individuals will rise to the level of their incompe- 
tence. Stated more formally, we would say that individuals rise to the 
level at which their resources match a job's qualifications; after this point 
the rate of advancement begins to decline. Yet, this appraisal should be 
qualified for employees who have reached the highest salary grades of a 
company. From our results, and from reports of others (e.g., Kanter 
1977, pp. 181-86; Pfeffer 1981, pp. 251-54), it appears that educational 
attainment has little impact on advancement within senior management 
ranks; considerations of sponsorship, networks, and alliances are more 
relevant factors. 
Specific Educational Features 
Aside from these remarks about the dynamics of the advancement pro- 
cess, there are findings specific to particular educational components. 
Ignoring minor inconsistencies we would say that a secretarial credential 
and a math/science/engineering major have effects that are invariant of 
rank, while a master's degree influences the promotion rate only in grade 
levels in which advanced academic skills are likely to contribute to pro- 
ductivity. 
This assessment is based on the additive effects of the different educa- 
tional terms. Formally, in this instance, with our data, we cannot differ- 
entiate between an explanation that stresses ability sorting and one that 
emphasizes learning. In actuality, the secretarial effect is likely to arise 
from a selection process. Evidence for this assertion resides in the nega- 
tive character of the credential (difficult to attribute to learning) and in 
the universality of its effect over the salary grades. We suspect that the 
math/science/engineering term also reflects an ability-sorting process- 
because of the lack of grade-level specificity-but the evidence here is 
far from conclusive. In comparison, the MA effect, which is specific to 
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the higher ranks, probably represents a learning process-the acquisition 
of skills necessary for productivity in these grades. 
A final theme concerns the evidence for "credentialism"; more gener- 
ally, for a "signal" hypothesis in which the signal is some educational 
feature that an employer chooses to invest with elevated significance. We 
find evidence that college quality and a business major function in this 
capacity. Moreover, each variable is credible as a signal in a context of 
uncertainty. College quality (or its correlate, prestige) has been cited 
as a factor upon which employers rely even when an association with 
productivity is not evident (Pfeffer 1981, p. 352). Similarly, a business 
major indicates commitment to the corporate world; one can imagine a 
preference for such workers when training investments have to be made 
and performance information is lacking. 
Nonetheless, we hesitate to make much of the evidence for a signal 
thesis. First, the variables traditionally associated with credentialism- 
earned degrees-fail to exhibit the pattern associated with this mecha- 
nism. Second, we lack a theory that would suggest which educational 
features are likely to be accorded significance or how the salience of the 
different features might vary by firm or industry. In this circumstance, 
our results-that some educational features exhibit "signal" effects while 
others do not-remain little more than interesting empirical regularities. 
We are in a somewhat different situation with respect to the additive 
effects of math/science/engineering major, school quality, and business/ 
secretarial study. The first two corroborate the reports of Wise (1975b) 
and Wales (1973); at least we are on surer empirical footing. The negative 
secretarial terms are credible because they are strong, consistent over the 
salary grades, and not counterintuitive. 
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